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We construct \simple" games implementing in Nash equilibria sev-
eral solutions to the problem of fair division. These solutions are
the no-envy solution, which selects the allocations such that no agent
would prefer someone else's bundle to his own, and several variants
of this solution. Components of strategies can be interpreted as al-
locations, consumption bundles, permutations, points in simplices of
dimensionalities equal to the number of goods or to the number of
agents, and integers. We also propose a simple game implementing
the Pareto solution and games implementing the intersections of the
Pareto solution with each of these solutions.
Key words. Nash implementation. No-envy. Divide-and-permute.1 Introduction
We are concerned here with the implementation by \simple" games of solu-
tions to the problem of fair division.
An informal description of this objective is as follows. A bundle of goods
has to be divided among a group of agents with equal claims on them. Given
a domain of such problems of fair division, de¯ned by a space of possible
preferences for the agents involved, a solution is a mapping associating with
each problem in the domain a subset of its set of feasible allocations. Suppose
that a solution ' has been chosen as being the most desirable. Given some
admissible problem, computing the allocations selected by ' for it requires
that preferences be known. Unfortunately, agents may well bene¯t from not
reporting their true preferences. In fact, it is well-known that on su±ciently
wide domains of preferences there is no well-behaved \strategy-proof" solu-
tion: for such a solution, each agent ¯nds it in his best interest to reveal his
true preferences, independently of what they are and independently of the
preferences announced by the others.1 In the two-person case, this was shown
for classical economies under the requirements of e±ciency and individual ra-
tionality (Hurwicz, 1972), and under the requirement of e±ciency and one of
several alternative requirements of fairness (Thomson, 1987). Considerably
more general results hold since strategy-proofness and e±ciency together
imply dictatorship (Zhou, 1991). The dictatorship conclusion holds even on
very narrow domains of homothetic or linear preferences (Schummer, 1997).
The program of identifying in the n-person case the implications of strategy-
proofness alone, that is, even in the absence of e±ciency, has been pushed
much further (Barberµ a and Jackson, 1995).
Unless preferences belong to some special domains,2 obtaining truthful
information as a dominant strategy is therefore incompatible with e±ciency
and minimal distributional objectives. We will then weaken our incentive
requirement as follows. Given a solution, we will only ask whether there is
a game form such that for each admissible problem, its set of Nash equilib-
rium allocations coincides with the set of allocations that the solution would
have selected for this problem. If such a game form exists, the solution is
said to be \implementable". The properties that a solution should satisfy in
1Then, truth-telling is a \dominant" strategy in the direct revelation game associated
with the solution.
2For instance, in a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences, the solution
known as the uniform rule is implementable in dominant strategies (Sprumont, 1991).
1order to be implementable are now well-understood, and general algorithms
have been proposed to construct game forms achieving the implementation
when it is possible. However, these algorithms, being designed to solve the
problem in very general situations, produce game forms that have the dis-
advantage of involving complex strategy spaces. Indeed, strategies include
either whole preference pro¯les or whole indi®erence sets for several agents.
In the economic applications we have in mind, these are in¯nite-dimensional
objects. Fortunately, when it comes to implementing speci¯c solutions, the
particular features of the space of feasible outcomes and of the space of ad-
missible preferences can be used to achieve considerable simpli¯cations. For
instance, a variety of game forms whose strategy spaces are subsets of ¯-
nite dimensional Euclidean spaces have been constructed to implement the
Walrasian and Lindahl solutions. (Hurwicz, 1979, and Walker, 1981; Tian,
1989; Corch¶ on and Wilkie, 1996.) Our objective here is the construction of
such simple game forms to implement several solutions to the problem of fair
division.
We ¯rst consider (i) the solution that associates with each problem its
set of \envy-free" allocations: an allocation is envy-free if each agent ¯nds
his bundle at least as desirable as the bundle assigned to anyone else. Al-
ternatively, we require that each agent ¯nds his bundle at least as desirable
as: (ii) the average bundle received by the other agents; (iii) the average
bundle received by any group to which he does not belong; (iv) any bundle
in the convex hull of the bundles of all the agents.3 In each case, we show
that implementation is possible by means of a game form whose strategy
spaces are the cross-product of a subset of a ¯nite dimensional Euclidean
space with some ¯nite set. We also propose a simple game form (v) imple-
menting the Pareto solution, the solution that associates with each economy
its set of Pareto-e±cient allocations. Here, strategy spaces are slightly more
complicated but they are still ¯nite dimensional Euclidean spaces. Finally,
(vi) we show how the distributional objectives embodied in the various solu-
tions listed above can be reconciled with e±ciency by \combining" the game
forms implementing them with the game form implementing the Pareto so-
lution. We achieve this by identifying a class of solutions that contains each
of the above-mentioned examples, and constructing a general game form for
the class. However, we also devise a separate game form for the no-envy
solution. We name this game form \Divide-and-Permute".
3The relations between these various notions are explained below.
2For each of the game forms we construct, the components of strategies
have a straightforward economic interpretation as allocations, consumptions
bundles, or prices, and (except for Divide-and-Permute which does not have
it), one component is an integer that is used as a device to select an agent
who is granted the right to choose in a certain set. This set is determined
as a function of the other components of the strategies. The use of such
\integer" constructions has been criticized (Jackson, 1992), but not having
access to them severely limits the range of solutions that can be implemented
(again, see Jackson, 1992). An appealing aspect of our game forms is that
at equilibrium, agents receive the bundles that have been announced. (This
feature essentially corresponds to what Dutta, Sen, and Vohra, 1995, calls
\truth-telling".) Without it, there would be little meaning to evaluating how
complicated a game form is by the dimensionality of its strategy spaces, since
information can be \smuggled" by means of such mathematical devices as
Peano's space ¯lling curve. Hurwicz (1977) was the ¯rst to recognize this
possibility in this context (see also Chakravorti, 1991), and avoided it by
placing restrictions on the game forms.
A contribution with a similar aim as ours, namely the investigation of
the implications of requiring game forms to be \simple", is the paper just
mentioned by Dutta, Sen, and Vohra. These authors characterize the class
of solutions that can be implemented by what they call \elementary" game
forms, that is, game forms such that at equilibrium, the set of bundles that
each agent can attain by varying his own strategy, given the strategies cho-
sen by the others, is a subset of the half-space bounded by a hyperplane
of support to his upper contour set at his assigned bundle. The Pareto
solution is one of the solutions covered by their theorem, but none of the
solutions to the problem of fair division that we discuss here can be handled
because they all fail to satisfy a condition that is critical to their approach,
namely that the desirability of an allocation be veri¯able on the basis of lo-
cal information only (in the case of smooth preferences, the marginal rates of
substitution).4 Therefore, our results throw some light on the strength of the
requirement that the game form be elementary. Similarly, SjÄ ostrÄ om (1991a)
considers implementation by \demand game forms", that is, game forms in
which strategies are points in the commodity space that can be interpreted
4Although one should note that if preferences are smooth, the smallest of the corre-
spondences that we consider coincides then with the Walrasian solution, to which the
condition does apply.
3as agents' desired bundles. He shows that the no-envy solution can be so im-
plemented but that neither the Pareto solution nor its intersection with the
no-envy solution can, indicating that limiting oneself to demand game forms
may also be too restrictive. We ¯nally comment on the results independently
obtained by Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato (1996). These authors identify
the conditions that a solution has to satisfy in order to be implemented by a
game form in which strategies are required to be interpretable as one of the
following: a consumption bundle, a pair of bundles, an allocation, a bundle
and a price vector, and ¯nally a pair of bundles and a price vector.
They apply their result to the no-envy solution and its intersection with
the Pareto solution. They show that the former can be implemented by a
game form where each agent announces two consumption bundles, and its
intersection with the Pareto solution by a game form in which each agent
announces a bundle and a price. In the game forms they consider, all agents
have the same strategy space, whereas here, two agents are made to play a
special role. The implications in terms of dimensionality of the requirement
that strategy spaces be the same for all agents may be a question worthy
of further study. For a more complete comparison of the results of Saijo,
Tatamitani, and Yamato with those of the current paper, one would also
need to verify whether the other examples of solutions examined here satisfy
the conditions they derive. We will also leave this question to future research.
Finally, we note that although our main objective was to construct game
forms with strategy spaces of low dimensionality, we did not address the
issue of identifying the dimensionality that is minimal for implementation.
A contribution on this issue is Reichelstein and Reiter (1988). Dutta, Sen
and Vohra (1995), SjÄ ostrÄ om (1991a), and Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato
(1996) provide useful additional information on this matter.
2 The Model
There are ` private goods and n agents indexed by i 2 N = f1;:::;ng. Each
agent i 2 N is equipped with a continuous, convex, and strictly monotone
preference relation on R`
+, denoted by Ri. Let Pi be the associated strict
preference relation and Ii the corresponding indi®erence relation. There is
a bundle ­ 2 R`
++ of goods to be distributed. This bundle is ¯xed and
known. Thus, a problem of fair division, or an economy, is simply a list
R = (R1;:::;Rn) of preference relations. Let Z = fz 2 R`n
+ :
P
zi = ­g be
4the set of feasible allocations and Z0 = fz0 2 R`
+:z0 5 ­g be the set of
possible consumption bundles for any agent.
Given a domain of economies Rn, a solution is a correspondence ':Rn !
Z associating with each economy in the domain a non-empty subset of the
set of feasible allocations, each point of which is interpreted as a recommen-
dation.
A game form is a pair ¡ = (S;h), where S = S1 £ ¢¢¢ £ Sn is the cross-
product of strategy spaces, and h:S ! R`n
+ is the outcome function.
Given R 2 Rn, let E(¡;R) µ S be the set of (Nash)-equilibria of ¡
when played in R, and EZ(¡;R) be the corresponding set of equilibrium
allocations: z 2 EZ(¡;R) if there is s 2 E(¡;R) such that z = h(s). The
game form ¡ implements the solution ':Rn ! Z if for each R 2 Rn,
EZ(¡;R) = '(R). A solution is implementable if there is a game form
that implements it.
Consider now an abstract set of alternatives A, a domain R of preference
relations de¯ned over A, and a correspondence ':Rn ! A. Given i 2 N,
Ri 2 R and a 2 A, let L(Ri;a) = fb 2 A:a Ri bg be the lower contour
set of Ri at a. Maskin (1999) shows that if a correspondence ':Rn ! A
is implementable, then it satis¯es the following condition:
Monotonicity: For each fR;R0g µ Rn, and each a 2 '(R), if for each i 2 N,
L(R0
i;a) ¶ L(Ri;a), then a 2 '(R0).
A correspondence satis¯es \no veto power" if, when an alternative is at
the top of the preferences of all agents but possibly one, then it is selected
by the solution. Maskin shows that if there are at least three agents, and
the correspondence is monotonic and satis¯es no veto power, then it is im-
plementable. In private good economies, as soon as there is one good with
respect to which preferences are strictly monotone, no veto power is trivially
satis¯ed since then its hypothesis is never met. Having assumed that all pref-
erences are strictly monotone, monotonicity is then a necessary and su±cient
property that a correspondence need to satisfy in order to be implementable,
and we will make no more mention of no veto power.
Maskin's proof is constructive: he exhibits an algorithm producing, for
each implementable correspondence, a game form implementing it. Although
he restricts his attention to the case when the set of feasible alternatives is
¯nite, his result can be extended to general domains (Repullo, 1987; Saijo,
1988). Unfortunately, the game forms used by all of these authors have the
5drawback of involving complex strategy spaces, as explained in the introduc-
tion. Our objective is to construct game forms with simple strategy spaces.
Implementation of the Walras and Lindahl solutions by simple game forms
has been achieved by several authors, but few attempts have been made to
implement by simple game forms solutions to the problem of fair division.
The exceptions of which we are aware are the following: Crawford (1979)
proposes a game form implementing a selection from Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978)'s \egalitarian-equivalent" solution (see also Demange, 1984). Since
this selection is not monotonic, the implementation is of course not achieved
in Nash equilibrium; instead, it involves stage game forms and the concept
of perfect equilibrium. Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) verify conditions for
the implementation of the no-envy solution but their focus is on Bayesian
implementation. Here, we consider normal form games and implementation
in Nash equilibrium. Another exception is Tadenuma and Thomson (1995),
who o®er an implementation of the no-envy solution for a class of economies
with one indivisible object and one in¯nitely divisible good by means of a
game form in which each strategy space is the real line5;6. A ¯nal reference
is SjÄ ostrÄ om (1991a), already discussed.
3 Divide-and-Permute : an implementation
of the no-envy solution
A requirement that plays a central important role in the literature on fair
allocation is that each agent should ¯nd his bundle at least as desirable as
anyone else's bundle (Foley, 1967):
The no-envy solution, F, selects, for each R 2 Rn, all the allocations
z 2 Z such that for each fi;jg µ N, zi Ri zj. These allocations are called
envy-free for R.
It is easy to see that the no-envy solution is monotonic. Thus, it can
be implemented by the Maskin-Repullo-Saijo game forms. The following is
5Whether this game form can be generalized to handle the multiple object case remains
to be determined however.
6The implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division in economies with
one good when preferences are single-peaked is considered by Thomson (1990), SjÄ ostrÄ om
(1991b), and Yamato (1992,1993), but these papers do not address the issue of implemen-
tation by simple game forms.
6a simple game form achieving the implementation. Let ¦n be the class of
permutations on N and ¼0 be the identity permutation.
Divide-and-Permute, ¡F: S1 = S2 = Z £ ¦n and S3 = ¢¢¢ = Sn = ¦n.
Given s = ((z1;¼1), (z2;¼2);¼3;:::;¼n) 2 S = S1 £ ¢¢¢ £ Sn, let
h(s) =
½
(0;0;:::;0) if z1 6= z2;
¼n ± ¼n¡1 ± ::: ± ¼1(z1) if z1 = z2:
The game form can be informally described as follows. The ¯rst two agents
are dividers (each proposes an allocation), and everyone proposes a per-
mutation; if the dividers disagree, they are penalized. If they agree on an
allocation, each agent (including them) can reach any of its components by
appropriately choosing his permutation, and this, independently of the per-
mutations chosen by the others.
The name \Divide-and-Permute" is meant to bring to mind the well-
known two-person \Divide-and-Choose" procedure (one agent divides and
the other chooses). However, a number of important distinctions should be
noted. In Divide-and-Choose, only one agent proposes a division; here, two
agents do so. Divide-and-Choose is a stage game form; here, we consider
normal form games. Divide-and-Choose provides a partial implementation
of the no-envy solution since only the allocation in the envy-free set that is
the most favorable to the divider is obtained at equilibrium (Kolm, 1972;
Crawford, 1977); here, we obtain full implementation (in addition, each
envy-free allocation is obtained at some equilibrium.) Finally, a number of
complications arise in extending Divide-and-Choose to the n-person case (See
Brams and Taylor, 1996, for a presentation of the literature devoted to such
extensions); here, the n-person case poses no special problem. In fact, for
n ¸ 3, additional desirable properties can be imposed on the game form (See
Remark 3 below).
We use the following additional notation. For each s 2 S and each
i 2 N, atti(s) is the set of bundles attainable by agent i at s, namely
fzi 2 R`
+:zi = hi(s0
i;s¡i) for some s0
i 2 Sig.7
Theorem 1 Divide-and-Permute implements the no-envy solution.
Proof: Step 1: If z 2 EZ(¡F;R), then z 2 F(R). Let s =
((z1;¼1);(z2;¼2);¼3;:::;¼n) be an equilibrium supporting z. We have




ng; the ¯rst bundle results from choosing any s0
1 =
(z0;¼) 2 S1 such that z0 6= z2; each of the remaining ones is obtained by
choosing a pair s0
1 = (z2;¼) for some appropriate ¼. Since at least one
of the components of z2 contains a positive amount of at least one good,
and agent 1 has strictly monotone preferences, s1 = (z1;¼1) is a best re-
sponse to s¡1 only if z1 = z2. Thus, z = ¼n ± ¼n¡1 ± :::¼2 ± ¼1(z1). (Simi-
larly, att2(s) = f0;z1
1;z1
2;:::;z1
ng). Now, given that z1 = z2, if follows that
for each i 2 Nnf1;2g, atti(s) = fz1;z2;:::;zng. Thus, equilibrium occurs
only because the ¼i's are such that for each i 2 N, the ith component of
¼n ± ¼n¡1 ± :::¼2 ± ¼1(z1) maximizes Ri over fz1;z2;:::;zng, which means
that z 2 F(R).
Step 2: If z 2 F(R), then z 2 EZ(¡F;R). Indeed, let s = ((z;¼0),
(z;¼0), ¼0;:::;¼0). Then, h(s) = z. Here, att1(s) = f0;z1;:::;zng, and since
for each i 2 N, z1 R1 zi, and z1 R1 0, it follows that (z;¼0) is a best response
to s¡1 for agent 1. Similarly, (z;¼0) is a best response to s¡2 for agent 2.
Finally, for each i 2 Nnf1;2g, atti(s) = fz1;:::;zng. Since for each j 2 N,
zi Ri zj, it follows that ¼0 is a best response for agent i to s¡i.
¤
Remark 1. It would su±ce to have each agent announce a transposition
(a permutation exchanging only two components), instead of an arbitrary
permutation.
Remark 2. Implementation occurs even for n = 2. This is worth noting
since, as is well-known (see Moore, 1992, or Corch¶ on, 1996, for surveys of the
relevant results), implementation for n = 2 is often more di±cult to achieve
than for n > 2.
Remark 3. If n > 2, the outcome function can be re-speci¯ed so that no
resource is ever thrown away, that is, so that for each s 2 S,
P
hi(s) = ­
(not just at equilibrium). When z1 6= z2, set h(s) = (0;0;­;0:::;0) for
instance (any distribution of the social endowment ­ between agents 3 to n
would do).8
Remark 4. Divide-and-Permute can be used to implement the no-envy solu-
tion on domains of economies with heterogeneous goods such as land or time,
the resource to be divided being modelled as a measurable subset of a ¯nite-
dimensional Euclidean space, with preferences de¯ned over its measurable
subsets. (The issue of existence of envy-free and e±cient allocations in this
8I owe this remark to B. Dutta.
8context is addressed by Weller, 1985, Stromquist, 1980, and Berliant, Dunz,
and Thomson, 1992). For time (the one-dimensional case), it is often natural
to assume that agents have preferences de¯ned over intervals and that of two
intervals ordered by inclusion, the larger one is preferred to the smaller one.
In this case, an envy-free allocation is necessarily e±cient (Berliant, Dunz
and Thomson, 1992), so that Divide-and-Permute achieves both e±ciency
and the distributional objective of no-envy.
4 Implementation of other solutions
In this section, we consider a variety of other solutions to the problem of
fair division, but instead of dealing with each of them separately, we o®er a
general procedure. The no-envy solution is covered by this procedure, How-
ever, Divide-and-Permute seems particularly natural for that solution, which
is why we felt that there would be some advantage to giving it separately.
We begin by listing the examples of solutions to which the general pro-
cedure applies. First, we require that each agent should ¯nd his bundle at
least as desirable as the average of the bundles of the others. This de¯nition
can be found in Thomson (1979, 1982), Baumol (1986) and Kolpin (1991),
to which we refer the reader for motivation.
The average no-envy solution, A, selects, for each R 2 Rn, all the
allocations z 2 Z such that for each i 2 N, zi Ri ai(z), where ai(z) =
(
P
j2Nnfig zj)=(n ¡ 1). These allocations are called average envy-free for
R.
A stronger de¯nition is that each agent should ¯nd his bundle at least
as desirable as the average bundle of any group not containing him. This
de¯nition is due to Zhou (1992) to which we refer the reader for motivation
and discussion. For each i 2 N, let Gi = fG µ N:i = 2 Gg denote the set of
groups not containing agent i:
The strict no-envy solution, C, selects, for each R 2 Rn, all the alloca-
tions z 2 Z such that for each i 2 N and each G 2 Gi, zi Ri
P
j2G zj=jGj.
These allocations are called strictly envy-free for R.
Finally, we require that each agent should ¯nd his bundle at least as
desirable as any bundle in the convex hull of the n bundles it comprises.
Given z1;:::;zn 2 R`
+, Hfz1;:::;zng denotes their convex hull (Kolm, 1973):
9The super no-envy solution, K, selects all the allocations z 2 Z such
that for each i 2 N and each z0
i 2 Hfz1;:::;zng, zi Ri z0
i. These allocations
are called super envy-free for R 2 Rn.
Note that if n = 2, no-envy and average no-envy coincide. However, if
n > 2, there is no logical relation between the concepts (Thomson, 1982).
The strict no-envy solution is a subsolution of both the no-envy and the
average no-envy solutions.9 The super no-envy solution is the smallest of the
distributional criteria discussed in this paper. It is a subsolution of the strict
no-envy solution, and if preferences are smooth, it actually coincides with
the Walrasian solution operated from equal division (Zhou, 1992).
The three solutions listed above are monotonic. Next, we present a game
that implements any solution in the following broad class, which includes all
three. The de¯nition is based on the simple observation that most equity
notions involve comparing what each agent receives to the bundles in some
appropriately de¯ned set. The set appears in the de¯nition of the game form,
each player being indeed given the choice to maximize his preference relation
in it:
De¯nition A solution ' belongs to the family © if there are a list (Vi)i2N
of sets and a list (¿i)i2N of functions ¿i:Vi £ Z ! Z0 such that for each
R 2 RN, each z 2 '(R), and for each i 2 N,
1. zi 2 ¿i(Vi;z), and for each z0
i 2 ¿i(Vi;z), zi Ri z0
i;
2. There is z0
i 2 ¿i(Vi;z) such that z0
i 6= 0.
Although this de¯nition may appear somewhat technical, it has the ad-
vantage of being quite general. In particular, the three examples given
above belong to ©, as now demonstrated:10 for the average no-envy solu-
tion, let Vi = f0;1g with generic element denoted by ki, and ¿i(ki;z) =
kizi + (1 ¡ ki)ai(zi); for the strict no-envy solution, let Vi = fGi;figg
with generic element denoted by Gi, and ¿i(Gi;z) =
P
j2Gi zj=jGij; for
9It can also be related by means of a consistency property to the average no-envy
solution. It is the \largest" consistent solution contained in it (Thomson, 1994).
10For the examples considered in the paper, it would actually su±ce to choose the sets
Vi to be subsets of the simplex. At the price of a somewhat greater complexity, our
formulation covers a wider family of solutions.




Note that all the members of © are monotonic. We now present a game
form implementing any one of them. In the speci¯cation of the outcome
function, when reference is made to agent i, the only non-zero component of
an allocation such as (0;:::;zi;:::;0) should be understood to appear in the
ith place. To implement a given ' 2 ©, we use its associated sets (Vi)i2N, so
that the simplicity of the implementation will obviously be directly related
to that of the (Vi)i2N.
Game form ¡': S1 = Z£N£V1, S2 = Z£N£V2, and for each i 2 Nnf1;2g,
Si = N £ Vi.








(0;:::;0) if z1 6= z2;
(0;:::;¿i(s)(vi(s);z1);:::;0) if z1 = z2 and ¿i(s)(vi(s);z1) 6= z1
i(s);
z1 if z1 = z2 and ¿i(s)(vi(s);z1) = z1
i(s):
Just as in the previous game form, this outcome function is designed so
as to ensure that at equilibrium, the ¯rst two agents announce the same
allocation. Once they agree on some z 2 Z, then for each i 2 N, agent i has
the opportunity to choose any of the points of ¿i(Vi;z1) (a set which includes
z1
i) by appropriately choosing in N. Each point of ¿i(Vi;z1) is obtained by
an appropriate choice of vi.
Theorem 2 Given any ' 2 ©, the game form ¡' implements the solution '.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Remark 5. As claimed earlier, the no-envy solution is covered by the theo-
rem. Take Vi = N with generic element ki and ¿i(ki;z) = zki.
5 Implementation of the Pareto solution
The solution considered next is central to economics: it associates with each
economy its set of Pareto e±cient allocations.
The Pareto solution selects, for each R 2 Rn, all the allocations z 2 Z
such that there is no z0 2 Z such that for each i 2 N, z0
i Ri zi, and for at
least one i 2 N, z0
i Pi zi.
11Under strict monotonicity of preferences, the Pareto solution is mono-
tonic. (For an example showing that if preferences are only weakly mono-
tone, the property may not hold, see Thomson, 1985, 1999). The solution
that associates with each economy its set of e±cient allocations such that
at some supporting prices the value of each agent's bundle is positive is also
monotonic. We ¯nd it convenient to work with this variant of the Pareto
solution, which we refer to as the \strong" Pareto solution. Note that under
strict monotonicity of preferences, the two di®er only in that the allocations
at which some agent receives nothing are excluded by the strong Pareto solu-
tion. These allocations are also excluded by all of the distributional criteria
considered above.
The strong Pareto solution, P, selects, for each R 2 Rn, all the alloca-
tions z 2 Z that are Pareto-e±cient for R and in addition have supporting
prices p 2 ¢`¡1 such that pzi > 0 for each i 2 N. These allocations are
called strongly Pareto-e±cient for R.
Consider the following game form, where D = f(z;p) 2 Z£¢`¡1: for each
i 2 N, pzi > 0g, and given (zi;p) 2 R`




Game form ¡P: S1 = S2 = D £ N £ Z0 and S3 = ¢¢¢ = Sn = N £ Z0.
Given s = ((z1;p1;t1;z1);(z2;p2;t2;z2);(t3;z3);:::;(tn;zn)) 2 S, let i(s) = P
ti (mod n) and
h(s) =
8
> > > > > > > <











(z1;p1) = (z2;p2);zi(s) 2 B(z1
i(s);p1);
and zi(s) 6= z1
i(s);
z1 if (z1;p1) = (z2;p2) and zi(s) = z1
i(s):
The inspiration for this game form is the Second Fundamental Welfare
theorem. Indeed, it works as follows: the ¯rst two agents, the dividers,
announce an allocation-price pair; the allocations can be interpreted as rec-
ommendations for the entire economy and the prices as supporting prices;
the outcome function is speci¯ed so as to guarantee that the dividers agree
on some allocation-price pair; in addition, each agent announces (i) an in-
teger, which is used to determine who is granted the right to object to the
12dividers' recommendation, and (ii) a bundle that can be interpreted as the
bundle that he feels he should receive; to be accepted, an objection should
be \reasonable" in that its value at the common prices announced by the
dividers should not exceed the value of the bundle the dividers intended for
him. If the objection is not reasonable, every one ends up with nothing. If
it is, the objector receives what he requested and the others receive nothing.
Theorem 3 The game form ¡P implements the strong Pareto solution.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
6 Implementation of equitable and e±cient
solutions
In the ¯nal section, we show how to take care of both distributional and
e±ciency objectives. Essentially, we combine the game form just proposed
to implement the strong Pareto solution, ¯rst with Divide-and-Permute|this
is the game form ¡F\P below|and then with the game form designed for the
implementation of any solution ' in the family ©, whenever this intersection
is well-de¯ned|this is the game form ¡'\P. Note that the intersection of two
monotonic solutions is also monotonic, provided it is a well-de¯ned solution.
This proviso is met for each of the examples in which we are interested since
they all contain the Walrasian solution operated from equal division.
Given (zi;p) 2 R`
+ £ ¢n¡1, the sets D and B(zi;p) are de¯ned as for the
game form ¡P.
Game form ¡F\P: S1 = S2 = D £ N £ Z0 £ ¦n and S3 = ¢¢¢ = Sn =
N £ Z0 £ ¦n:
Given s = ((z1;p1;t1;z1;¼1);(z2;p2;t2;z2;¼2);(t3;z3;¼3);:::;(tn;zn;¼n)) 2
S, let i(s) =
P
ti (mod n) and
h(s) =
8
> > > > > > > <











(z1;p1) = (z2;p2);zi(s) 2 B(z1
i(s);p1);
and zi(s) 6= z1
i(s);
¼n ± ::: ± ¼1(z1) if (z1;p1) = (z2;p2) and zi(s) = z1
i(s):
13Game form ¡'\P: S1 = S2 = D £ N £ Z0 £ Vi and for each i 2 Nnf1;2g,
Si = N £ Z0 £ Vi.
Given s = ((z1;p1;t1;z1;v1);(z2;p2;t2;z2;v2);(t3;z3;v3);:::;(tn;zn;vn)) 2 S,
let i(s) =
P








(z1;p1) = (z2;p2);zi(s) = z1
i(s);




(z1;p1) = (z2;p2);zi(s) = z1
i(s);
and ¿i(s)(vi(s);z1) = zi(s):
Theorem 4 The game form ¡F\P implements the solution F \ P.
Theorem 5 For each ' 2 © such that '\P is well-de¯ned, the game form
¡'\P implements the solution ' \ P.
We omit the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5, which are similar to the proofs
of Theorems 2 and 3, limiting ourselves to noting that as before, they involve
showing that at equilibrium, agents 1 and 2 announce the same allocation-
price pair, and that at the announced prices, the value of the bundle that the
agent designated by the function i(:) announces for himself is equal to the
value of his component of that common allocation. Given agents 1 and 2's
common announcement z, each agent's attainable set contains all the feasible
bundles whose value is less than the value of his component of z, and it may
contain additional bundles. These bundles are the components of z for ¡F\P
and the elements of Ãi(s)(z) for ¡'\P. By feasibility, no agent can end up
above his budget set. This implies the existence of parallel lines of support
to the indi®erence curves at each of the equilibrium bundles, and therefore
e±ciency. The attainability of the additional bundles guarantees that the
relevant equity criterion is met.
Remark 6. Implementation occurs even if n = 2.
Remark 7. If n > 2, the outcome function can be modi¯ed so that no
resource is ever thrown away.
Remark 8. The spaces of feasible allocations in models with heterogeneous
goods such as land or time do not have a convex structure and apart from
the no-envy solution, the examples of solutions examined above cannot be
applied to them.
Remark 9. The game forms we have proposed do not have continuous
outcomes functions. It is probably the case that techniques such as the ones
14developed by Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) and others could be applied
to obtain this property.
7 An open question
Given two solutions ' and '0 whose intersection is well-de¯ned, and two
game forms ¡ and ¡0 implementing them, is there a simple way of \connect-
ing" the game forms so as to obtain a game form c(¡;¡0) that implements
the intersection ' \ '0? The present paper started out with the objective of
developing such a general procedure c. In applications, one game form would
typically be chosen so as to implement a solution meeting some participation
or distributional criterion, another to implement the Pareto solution, and
the combined game form would implement their intersection. We presented
separately Divide-and-Permute and a game form implementing the Pareto
solution, and then combined them into a game form implementing their in-
tersection in order to give the °avor of what such an operation may look
like.11 We did not reach our initial objective with the generality that we
hoped but preliminary results are described in Thomson (1995).
11Of course, the question could be asked for each equilibrium concept, not just for Nash
equilibrium, on which we focused here. Of course, for the operation to be successful,
we would need the implementability conditions to be closed under intersection, but most
conditions are.
158 Appendix
In this appendix, we give the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Step 1: If z 2 EZ(¡';R), then z 2 '(R). Let s =
((z1;t1;v1);(z2;t2;v2);(t3;v3);:::;(tn;vn)) be an equilibrium supporting z.
First, we claim that z1 = z2. Indeed, att1(s) = f0g[¿1(V1;z2), the bundle 0
being obtained for any s0
1 = (z01;t0
1;v0
1) such that z01 6= z2, and each bundle
z0
1 2 ¿1(V1;z2) being obtained for s0
1 = (z2;t0
1;v0




= 1, (the expression on the left of the equality sign being calculated mod
n), and ¿1(v0
1;z2) = z0
1. By strict monotonicity of preferences, and the fact
that at least one bundle in ¿1(V1;z2) is not equal to 0, then necessarily
for some strategy available to agent 1, he prefers the bundle he receives
to 0. Thus, since s1 = (z1;t1;v1) is a best response to s¡1 for agent 1, we
have z1 = z2. Now, we cannot have ¿i(s)(vi(s);z1) 6= z1
i(s). Indeed, for any
j 2 Nnfi(s)g, attj(s) = f0g [ ¿j(Vj;z1), where the bundle 0 is obtained by
playing sj, and each point z0





k2Nnfjg tk = j, (the expression on the left being calculated mod
n), and v0
j such that ¿j(v0
j;z1) = z0
j. Since, again by strict monotonicity of
preferences, necessarily one of these attainable bundles is preferred to 0, the
claim is proved.
Step 2: If z 2 '(R), then z 2 EZ(¡';R). Indeed, let s =
((z;1;v1);(z;1;v2);(1;v3);:::;(1;vn)), where vi is such that for each i 2 N,
¿i(vi;z) = zi. Then, h(s) = z. We have att1(s) = f0g [ ¿1(Vi;z), where the
bundle 0 is obtained for any s0
1 = (z0;t0;v0
1) with z0 6= z, and each bundle
z0
1 2 ¿1(Vi;z) is obtained for s0
1 = (z;2;v0




1 for each z0
1 2 Ã1(z) and z1 R1 0, s1 is a best response to s¡1 for
agent 1. Similarly, s2 is a best response to s¡2 for agent 2. Finally, for any
i 2 Nnf1;2g, we also have atti(s) = ¿i(Vi;z), where each bundle z0
i 2 ¿i(Vi;z)
is obtained for s0
i = (i+1;v0




i. Again, since zi Ri z0
i for each z0
i 2 ¿i(Vi;z), si is a best
response to s¡i for agent i. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3
Step 1: If z 2 EZ(¡P;R), then z 2 P(R). First, if
s = ((z1;p1;t1;z1);(z2;p2;t2;z2);(t3;z3);:::;(tn;zn)) 2 EZ(¡P;R), then
(z1;p1) = (z2;p2). Indeed, att1(s) = B(z2
1;p2) : agent 1 receives 0 by an-
nouncing (z01;p0






1) such that t0
1 +
P
i2Nnf1g ti (mod n) = 1. Since prefer-
ences are strictly monotonic and B(z2
1;p2) contains positive points, it follows
that at equilibrium, (z1;p1) = (z2;p2). Similarly, att2(s) = B(z1
2;p2). Next, if
the equality (z1;p1) = (z2;p2) holds, then for each i 2 N, atti(s) = B(z1
i;p1) :
indeed, agent i can reach any point z0







j6=i tj = i (the expression on the left being calculated mod
n). Equilibrium requires that he obtains his preferred point in the set. This
is possible only if for each i 2 N, z0
i = zi. And then, z 2 P(R):
Step 2: If z 2 P(R), then z 2 EZ(¡P;R). If z 2 P(R), then by
the second fundamental welfare theorem, there is p 2 ¢`¡1 such that for
each i 2 N and each z0
i 2 R`
+ such that pz0
i · pzi, zi Ri z0
i. Now, let s =
((z;p;1;z1);(z;p;1;z2);(1;z3);:::;(1;zn)). Then, for each i 2 N, atti(s) =
B(zi;p). We omit the straightforward proof that s is indeed an equilibrium
and z the corresponding equilibrium allocation. ¤
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